Michael Gove’s war on professional historical expertise : conservative curriculum reform, extreme Whig history and the place of imperial heroes in modern multicultural Britain by Watson, Matthew
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/116945                  
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 





Michael Gove’s War on Professional Historical Expertise: 
Conservative Curriculum Reform, Extreme Whig History and the Place of Imperial Heroes in 













Accepted for publication in British Politics on May 7th 2019. 








Michael Gove’s War on Professional Historical Expertise: 
Conservative Curriculum Reform, Extreme Whig History and the Place of Imperial Heroes in 






Six years of continuously baiting his opponents within the history profession eventually amounted to 
little where it mattered most.  UK Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, finally backtracked 
in 2013 on his plans to impose a curriculum for English schools based on a linear chronology of the 
achievements of British national heroes.  His ‘history as celebration’ curriculum was designed to instil 
pride amongst students in a supposedly shared national past, but would merely have accentuated 
how many students in modern multicultural Britain fail to recognise themselves in what is taught in 
school history lessons.  Now that the dust has settled on Gove’s tenure as Secretary of State, the time 
is right for retrospective analysis of how his plans for the history curriculum made it quite so far.  How 
did he construct an ‘ideological’ conception of expertise which allowed him to go toe-to-toe for so 
long with the ‘professional’ expertise of academic historians and history teachers?  What does the 
content of this ideological expertise tell us about the politics of race within Conservative Party 
curriculum reforms?  This article answers these questions to characterise Gove as a ‘whig historian’ of 
a wilfully extreme nature in his attachment to imperial heroes as the best way to teach national history 












The originating myths of Britishness go back much further in time than the legal origins of Britain.  One 
such supposedly foundational myth applauds the political instincts of the British in opting at such an 
early stage in their pre-history for institutions that promote individual freedoms.  Yet this is to create 
for reasons of present-day political expedience an understanding of the past that was fundamentally 
unavailable at the time to participants in the struggle for civil liberties.  The existence of a lineage of 
liberal constitutionalism stretching back to ancient times was a rhetorical device of the earliest Whigs 
in the late seventeenth century (Zook, 2002, p.214).  It was designed to act as justification for the 
removal in 1688 of the last Stuart monarch, James II, depicting absolutist Stuart rule as a radical break 
with a lengthy national past that guaranteed the protection of individual rights (Jones, 1992, pp.1-2).  
However, it remains completely unclear what ‘the nation’ is taken to consist of in this regard.  The 
House of Stuart was infamous to Whigs for the way it ruled over England and not Britain, and the 
England it ruled over was internally divided and lacked the common external enemy that much later 
was to figure so prominently in political constructions of the idea of a liberal constitutionalist 
Britishness.  A socially, politically, culturally and ethnically homogeneous nation of Britons with a 
similarly homogeneous story to tell about itself was simply anathema to lives that were being led. 
 
Enter stage right Michael Gove.  “History, as some may know,” Gove (2014a, p.2) told one of his last 
hand-picked audiences as Secretary of State for Education, “is one of my passions”.  The qualification 
‘as some may know’ was almost entirely unnecessary, because anybody who had followed his 
statements during his four-year tenure at the Department for Education would have recognised this 
claim as a familiar feature of his set-piece speeches.  The passion he has for history should never be 
underestimated, but the important point for the purpose of this paper is the political claims he 
thought it enabled him to make.  In his mind at least, it allowed him to enter debates as an equal with 
those whose capacity to speak on behalf of the community of professional historians had been 
nurtured through much more conventional academic means.  His passion facilitated a self-made 
construction of an ‘ideological’ conception of expertise, which he treated as being on a par with the 
professional expertise of academic historians and history teachers.  That is, the fact that he cares so 
deeply about the ‘proper’ way to teach history at school was used as a self-designated resource for 
ensuring that his opinions on the topic were equally self-imbued with an unquestionable aura of 
knowing what was best for the country’s children.  As Michael Young (2011, p.273) has noted, Gove 
has always found it easy to get “carried away by his own enthusiasms”.  To Rory Coonan (2015, p.455), 
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this amounted to “public pronouncements on education [which] frequently resembled those of the 
iconic winter robin, who defends his territory by singing fiercely from a high place”. 
 
Just as important as this self-elevation to expert status, though, was his reduction to the status of 
mere opinion more conventional professional expert analysis that failed to align with his own views.  
The alleged equality of viewpoint that followed allowed him always to be on the front foot rhetorically.  
Whether the weight of numbers in the debate was decisively against him counted for little in this 
regard.  Gove would repeatedly go back to a well-worn position about what was wrong with the 
English education system to the exasperation of historians who knew that his claims did not add up.  
He was able to run for so long with his preferred curriculum – whiggish though it was in the extreme 
– because he was temporarily able to fix the image of historical expertise as merely one opinion 
against another.  The article has its primary contribution in showing how straightforward Conservative 
politicians still find it to promote imperial heroes as role models for teaching young people about the 
national character.  Yet it also helps to reveal more about Gove’s tactic – subsequently deployed to 
greater effect in the 2016 EU referendum – of re-presenting professional expertise as mere opinion. 
 
Whilst this tactic was all his own, Gove can be seen as merely the latest education minister to be 
entrusted to articulate the Conservative Party’s preference for traditional educational methods in the 
so-called ‘history wars’.  These now date back unresolved in the UK to the 1970s.  Consistent with all 
his Conservative predecessors, Gove took issue with what he believed to be the unpatriotic approach 
of history professionals to questions of Britain and Britishness.  Whereas they write about an essential 
fragmentation of Britain overlain only relatively recently with a unifying political mythology that 
obscures the continual presence of multiple variants of Britishness, Gove followed earlier Conservative 
politicians in preaching the need to tell the single story of how Britain has come to be the 
unproblematic unitary entity that he considers it to be today.  Whereas they worry about exclusionary 
effects that must necessarily follow from presenting Britishness in singular terms, he insisted that his 
curriculum provided a national story in which every citizen could feel the same outpourings of pride.  
Whereas they want to emphasise the faltering way in which the modern understanding of nationhood 
came together, he set civil servants the task of stipulating a linear chronology of national progress.  
Gove thus found himself on a well-trodden path of dissent.  Since the right-wing think tank the Centre 
for Policy Studies first became animated in the 1970s by the possibility that an educational 
establishment existed whose approach to national history sought to talk Britain down, every MP who 
has held the Conservative education portfolio has activated this particular argument concerning what 
Gove (2010a, p.6) called the “trashing of our past”.  He wanted a seamless thread of national 
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characteristics to be brought to life via the exploits of heroes who were exemplars of the British 
character, “so that we can celebrate the distinguished role of these islands in the history of the world” 
(Gove 2010b, c.634). 
 
However, the liberal constitutionalist account of ancient British traditions of securing individual 
freedoms has both a distinct temporality and a distinct spatiality that rendered Gove’s vision 
problematic.  The idea of Britain was forged in the eighteenth century simultaneously with the idea of 
a Greater Britain that resulted from practices of white settler colonialism (Wellings, 2016, p.369).  The 
rhetorical trick at that time was to present the relationship between the imperial self and the 
colonised other as a replica of the relationship between adults and children (Emberley, 2007, p.71).  
To quote Uday Singh Mehta (1990, p.443), a “civilizational infantilism” was projected onto people of 
colour to explicitly deny them the constitutional privileges that attended the assumption of agential 
free will back home.  There was no real discussion of protecting the individual freedoms of distant 
people of colour as part of the imperial project, because it was supposed that child-like ‘natives’ first 
had to have their interests secured by an adult-like imperial master (Chatterjee, 2012, p.179).  Perhaps 
because of the sensitivities that this situation now evokes, or perhaps merely because subsequent 
processes of formal decolonisation disrupt straightforwardly linear narratives of British national 
achievement, the structure of empire appears to have been something from which Gove’s 
Conservative predecessors typically shied away.  Yet the heroes from which Gove believed all British 
children could take pride contained those who had made their name specifically in relation to Britain’s 
imperial mission, as they subjugated people of colour to hand new territorial acquisitions to the crown. 
 
The two main issues at hand, then, are the continuing appeal to Empire to create rhetorical structures 
that seek to put the ‘Great’ back into Great Britain, and the specific appeal to an ideological conception 
of historical expertise which Gove used to make such a case.  In order to explore these issues further, 
my analysis now proceeds in three stages.  In section one, I analyse the way in which Gove used a 
multi-tiered construction of a crisis in school history teaching to open the political space for his own 
interventions.  Whilst paying scant regard to whether the malaise he described matched actual 
experiences within English schools, he attempted broad-based rhetorical entrapment designed to 
imbue his clearly partisan ideas about the curriculum with common-sense attributes.  His objective 
was always to present himself as just as much an expert on curriculum matters as professional 
historians.  I show in section two, however, that Gove’s self-proclaimed expertise relied on him 
positioning himself in line with what Herbert Butterfield had rather disparagingly called ‘whig 
historians’ as long ago as the 1930s.  If it is not bad enough that this approach to history is now widely 
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discredited, even in the pursuit of whig history Gove rather dramatically misread the book to which 
he referred when presenting his chosen vision for the curriculum: Henrietta Elizabeth Marshall’s 1905 
book for children, Our Island Story.  Section three develops this theme, contrasting Marshall’s clear 
ambivalence towards a conventional understanding of national heroes with Gove’s attempt to 
resuscitate those whose only claim on hero status required Britain to be placed back within the frame 
of its imperial past.  In thus ignoring the implications of his own ‘island story’ for how to create a 
history curriculum fit for a modern multicultural society, Gove rushed in where previous equally 
traditionalist Conservative Secretaries of State for Education had feared to tread. 
 
 
Gove as History Expert 
 
Ten months after Gove became Secretary of State for Education, England’s schools watchdog, Ofsted 
(2011), published a report into the state of school-level history.  Its account could have been describing 
a completely different world to the one that underpinned Conservative education policy at that time.  
As the specialist education studies literature has amply demonstrated, the schools inspectorate’s 
History for All document struck a noticeably upbeat tone (Harris, Downey and Burn, 2012, p. 432; 
Cramsie, 2015, p.497; Peterson, 2016, p.866; Doull and Townsend, 2018, p.685).  It cites statistics 
showing that the numbers taking formal examinations in history at age 16 were holding up despite an 
increasingly pressurised timetable, and it also cites research which showed that students welcomed 
the polyvocality of the current curriculum content and its associated assumptions that history could 
be viewed from many different perspectives simultaneously (Evans, 2013b).  Gove’s response was 
merely to repeat the assertions he had been making for some years about a subject field in crisis and 
history professionals unable to see what was in front of their eyes.  Niall Ferguson, the last high-profile 
historian to remain steadfastly by Gove’s side during the long-running dispute over the history 
curriculum, sang from exactly the same song sheet.  His response to the Ofsted report was to lament 
an “educational establishment in deep denial about the damage its beloved ‘new history’ has done” 
(Ferguson, cited in Bowen et al, 2012, p.136).  The so-called ‘new history’ was actually not mentioned 
once in the whole of the 22,000-word report. 
 
Back in the late 1980s, when another Conservative Government was struggling to impose its chosen 
version of the history curriculum over the wishes of the professional community, it consistently 
invoked what Stephen Ball (1990, p.18) has called “a discourse of derision” in order to popularise its 
cause.  Gove latterly did exactly the same.  In both instances attempts were made to construct a 
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fictitious enemy, one that took perverse delight in depriving school-age students of the wonders of a 
‘proper’ history education.  What emerges is the image of a self-serving educational elite that is 
impervious to both popular pressure and political common-sense, with gallant holders of the 
Conservative education portfolio setting out on the lonely road to dethroning it in the interests of a 
return to “the discipline of chronology” (Gove, 2009a, p.11).  Gove’s specific attack on the educational 
establishment focused on his belief that it had set itself to deny school-age students access to the 
facts relating to the events through which British nationhood had been forged – and, as a corollary, to 
deny them access to the essential meaning of Britishness that could only be made known through “a 
clear narrative” of “key events” (Gove, 2013b, p.4; 2010b, c.633). 
 
In a 2009 speech whilst still Shadow Secretary of State, Gove (2009a, p.6) took the Qualification and 
Curriculum Development Agency to task because it “does not make its principal aim a guarantee – 
entitlement if you prefer – that each pupil will have access to a body of knowledge”.  This was a theme 
to which he warmed when the ministerial job became his after the 2010 General Election.  Six months 
later, he told Parliament from the despatch box that he could be trusted to ensure that “all children 
gain a secure knowledge of British history” (Gove, 2010b, c.633).  “[E]ssential knowledge” was then 
conflated with “facts” in the press release that announced the launch of the curriculum review when 
the Government was still only eight months old (Gove, 2011, p.5).  Whilst still in opposition, he 
denounced the current custodians of the system for “the remorseless retreat from rigour in the exams 
we set our children” (Gove, 2009b, p.4).  When in government this became the need to test 
“knowledge” that would take the form of “rich factual detail about [the nation’s] heritage” and would 
be examined through “the power of memorisation” (Gove, 2013a, pp. 9, 10; 2013d, p.9). 
 
Gove faced mounting scepticism from the professional community during his tenure at the 
Department for Education concerning the veracity of his claims.  In response, his attacks on his critics 
became increasingly ad hominem; the education studies literature tends to depict this as Gove not 
knowing his brief sufficiently well, journalistic and political science accounts that this was merely his 
temperament coming to the fore (see Guyver, 2013; Tipping, 2013; d’Ancona, 2014; Finn, 2015; Harris 
and Burn, 2016; Mansfield, 2018).  In addition to his concern for why facts did not play a more 
substantial role in the teaching of history, he now placed a greater emphasis on the people who 
decreed that this should be so.  He had always pointed to the dangers posed by trendily progressive 
“educational theorists” who believed that teachers “shouldn’t be doing anything so old-fashioned as 
passing on knowledge … or immersing [their students] in anything like dates in history” (Gove, 2010a, 
p.4).  Yet he latterly took to directly mocking his opponents, including 100 academics who had written 
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an open letter at the height of the history wars questioning his pedagogical approach, saying in 
response that the professors felt it was “a tragedy that the secretary of state would like children to 
learn things” (Gove, 2013e).  When in opposition, Gove (2009b, p.4) talked generally about his desire 
to overturn “the defeatism, the political correctness and the entrenched culture of dumbing down” 
that weighed so heavily upon children’s ability to learn.  By the time of his last year in post, however, 
he appeared to have become specifically transfixed by “the guilty men and women who have deprived 
a generation of the knowledge they need”, expressing his unconcealed contempt when describing 
them as “the modern Enemies of Promise” (2013c, p.2).  He dismissed as ivory tower ideologues those 
educational theorists he felt were “so heavily invested in the regime of low expectations and narrow 
horizons which they have created” (Gove, 2013d, p.2).  And he bemoaned what these theorists had 
done to the status of the teaching profession, with teachers having been “demoted from being ‘the 
sage on the stage’ [imparting facts] to a ‘guide by the side’ [helping children to follow their own 
instincts]” (Gove, 2013a, p.3). 
 
For someone who placed such emphasis on the allegation that facts had been allowed to go missing 
from the history curriculum, Gove’s free-and-easy approach to the factual basis of his own position 
was really rather noticeable.  Eminent historians took him to task for what they saw as his deliberate 
mischaracterisation of the existing curriculum in favour of easy wins in the eyes of a supportive right-
wing press (Alexander and Weekes-Bernard, 2017, pp.482, 487).  Academic research has shown 
consistently that students’ fondness for history increases the more they feel empowered to decide for 
themselves on matters of political interpretation (Harris, 2013, p.400).  Gove, meanwhile, presented 
himself as a darling of the Conservative Party Conference by insisting instead that it was in all 
children’s interest to learn by rote the accomplishments that had made Britain great and that 
established the national character that they have inherited.  What was his justification for taking a 
position that drew a positive response from only 4% of the Historical Association’s membership (Eales, 
2013)?  “Because this is what parents want”, he replied (Gove, 2013d, p.2; see also, 2013a, p.2, 2014a, 
p.6, 2014b, p.5), as if none of the dissenting 96% of Historical Association members were themselves 
also parents.  As the history wars reached a crescendo of ferocity following the publication of the 
much-derided draft curriculum in February 2013, Gove turned repeatedly to homespun homilies that 
elevated the abstract category of ‘the parent’ to the position of ultimate arbiter on what should be 
taught in school history lessons. 
 
Speech after speech appealed directly to parents’ wishes for their children to learn “gripping 
narratives” focused squarely on the achievements of “heroes”, those “whose example is truly 
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inspirational” (Gove, 2013d, p.9, 2013b, p.4, 2013a, p.11).  This appears to be a fairly obvious attempt 
at rhetorical entrapment by forcing history professionals – Gove’s fictitious enemy of the educational 
establishment – into the uncomfortable position of having to oppose ‘what every parent wants for 
their child’.  The theory of rhetorical entrapment suggests that only a minimal condition must apply if 
people are to defer to an argument where once they had taken a contrary position.  They do not have 
to be persuaded that they were previously ill-informed, wrong even, only that they do not have a good 
answer to the proposition being presented to them (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, pp.44-7).  It hardly feels 
natural, of course, to believe that in anything other than exceptional circumstances parents will ever 
knowingly and deliberately select a course of action that is not the best available for their children.  In 
the presumed belief that his critics would not argue against something that it looked impossible to 
argue against, Gove attempted to secure complete rhetorical entrapment in what would otherwise 
almost certainly have looked like a strange meeting of minds with the early twentieth-century 
Christian socialist, R.H. Tawney.  In a 2013 speech at the height of the history wars, he said that: 
“Tawney, the great progressive thinker, argued that, ‘what a wise parent would wish for their children, 
so the State must wish for all its children’” (Gove, 2013d, p.2).  Here we see someone generally 
considered to be a divisive Secretary of State for Education try to silence his critics by equating his role 
in government with the image of the collective wise parent of all British children, where parents always 
know what is best. 
 
Gove was consequently able to present his own expertise as at least the equal of anyone else’s claim 
on that status.  He had changed the whole nature of expertise so that it related not to the authority 
to speak on matters of curriculum design, but to whether, when speaking, you echoed his thoughts.  
Expertise was thus reduced to the voicing of opinions, with expert status withheld from those who, 
from his perspective, spoke as contrarians.  The distribution of numbers in the debate was irrelevant 
in this regard.  Gove could happily ignore just how many historians were hostile to his plans by name-
checking a dozen who remained supportive.  Richard Evans (2013a) helpfully worked through that list 
to explain that: “Only three of them are actually involved in teaching history at British universities, and 
two of those are associated with an obscure right-wing Conservative think tank called Politeia, on 
whose board of advisors sits none other than Gove”.  Gove’s response was to ridicule claims that this 
meant it was “‘Govey’ versus academia” by drawing a deliberately provocative distinction between 
“good academia and bad academia” (Gove, 2013e).  ‘Good academia’, it perhaps hardly needs saying, 
was constituted by those – however few – who agreed with his views on curriculum content.  But that 
seems to place Evans, who had criticised him remorselessly throughout the most recent outbreak of 
the history wars, in the camp of ‘bad academia’, with his claims on expertise correspondingly revoked.  
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Yet this was Richard Evans, until his retirement in 2014 the Regius Professor of History at the University 
of Cambridge, who Gove (2013d, p.8) himself heaped praise on for his “superb historical account … of 
the rise, rule and ruin of the Third Reich”, just as he was also turning the history wars particularly 
personal.  His diatribes against “academics’ pet passions” and his construction of an unbridgeable 
divide between academics and parents therefore look entirely expedient (Gove, 2014a, p.6). 
 
Gove was relentless in his depiction of an education system in hock to a discredited establishment 
ideology and thus generically crisis-prone, where resistance to his proposals for the history curriculum 
was merely symptomatic of the wider malaise (Gove, 2007, p.6, 2010a, p.4, 2013c, p.3, 2013f, p.5, 
2014b, p.8).  How much truth is embedded in these attacks is entirely unimportant (Smith, 2017, 
p.314), because truthfulness was replaced as the ultimate rationale for the crisis construction by 
Gove’s underlying ideological purpose.  All along, the history wars were a front for the particular – and 
particularly whiggish – political story of national lineage that he was determined to impose come what 
may (Middleton, cited in Bowen et al, 2012, p.136).  His was the same basic story that Conservative 
think tanks, politicians and newspapers had been advocating for forty years, as theoretical work on 
changing understandings of Britishness and Englishness have demonstrated only too clearly (Wellings, 
2012; Kenny, 2014; Kenny and Pearce, 2018; Murphy, 2018; Wellings, 2019). 
 
The contours of the political debate about what sort of British history English schoolchildren should 
learn can therefore be relatively easily stated.  It revolved around how celebratory that history should 
be and how far critical commentary should be allowed to disrupt an overwhelmingly positive narrative 
of national achievement in the sphere of defending individual freedoms.  Yet this in itself merely goes 
to show why the vast majority of professional historians were so concerned about Gove’s plans for 
the curriculum.  He presented the outline of an almost wholly celebratory curriculum in which the 
‘facts’ that he claimed had been denied to previous generations of English schoolchildren could only 
be pieced together in distinctively whiggish terms to paint the British national past in a hugely 
flattering light.  But in doing so he had also presented an approach to British history that had been 
thoroughly discredited in the eyes of historians almost a century previously.  Gove had positioned 
himself as the key contemporary proponent of what Herbert Butterfield dismissed in the 1930s in his 







Gove as Extreme Whig Historian 
 
Butterfield (1950 [1931], p.92) had suggested that the task of historians was to engage in “imaginative 
sympathy”, through which they could rid their analyses of the influences of the political controversies 
of their own day whilst still “mak[ing] the past intelligible to the present”.  The task of historians was 
thus to reconstruct in as detached a manner as possible the thought processes of their analytical 
subjects (Hobart, 1971, p.545).  Butterfield’s criticism of nineteenth-century British historians was that 
they had become not only historians of the Victorian state, but also historians for the Victorian state.  
That is, the only people whose thought processes they tried to inhabit were those whose imprints on 
the cultural life of the nation were consistent with a story of national success, and the precise story 
they told about these national heroes provided a comforting backdrop to the reproduction of the 
contemporary state form.  The past that emerged, according to Butterfield (1950 [1931], pp.22-6, 96-
103), was a convenient ‘abridgement’ suited only to facilitating speculative assessments of the past 
that aligned with the national self-image of the present.  He warned against the tendency “to produce 
a scheme of general history which is bound to converge beautifully upon the present” (Butterfield, 
1950 [1931], p.12).  However, he found this pretty much everywhere he looked in Victorian 
scholarship (McIntyre, 2014, p.208).  Nineteenth-century historians typically saw only the best in their 
own society, as if the promise of personal freedoms was the genuine lived experience for all of its 
members.  Consequently, they chose to view the past as a series of coherent staging posts to the 
condition at which they assumed they had arrived in the present. 
 
Gove’s preferred curriculum represents perhaps the prime example of whig history in action today.  It 
is very difficult to see him as anything other than an artefact of nineteenth-century thinking, despite 
his protestations to the contrary.  “It amazes me”, he said in one of his last public speeches before 
being relieved of his duties as Secretary of State for Education, “that some try to caricature our 
curriculum as backward-looking” (Gove, 2014b, p.6).  His retort to his critics – “when I ask for the 
specifics behind criticism of our policies I don’t see, or hear, evidence that stands up to scrutiny” 
(Gove, 2014b, p.8) – focused on the proposition that is entertained seriously by a number of cognitive 
scientists today that the route to understanding first passes through committing facts to memory.  Yet 
this is to conveniently miss the point of the critics’ allegations.  The previous curriculum that Gove had 
so ridiculed for its supposedly fact-free nature was actually accompanied by an assessment regime 
that was weighted 70% in favour of content issues: put simply, the ability to recall facts.  The critics 




Evans (2011, p.10), for instance, requested greater discussion of why Department for Education civil 
servants were only being asked to see how the “struggles of the past” could be folded into a single 
national constitutional narrative about why British people today enjoy “the liberties of the present”.  
Gove’s pronouncements on the curriculum never countenanced a counter emphasis on how those 
struggles were exceptionally hard won in the face of significant oppression of the popular will and 
against the wishes of those who wanted to keep the privileges of personal freedoms to themselves.  
The story that Gove’s curriculum was designed to tell operated on the simple assertion that British 
political institutions remain the best in the world, as they have always been, and that British history 
can therefore be reduced to the history of pioneering liberal constitutionalism (Gove, 2007, p.2).  Even 
his maiden speech to the House of Commons played to this theme, with Gove (2005) telling his fellow 
MPs in true whig historical fashion that: “Historians of this House will know that our finest hour came 
in the seventeenth century, when we in Parliament insisted on limiting the arbitrary powers of the 
Executive”. 
 
There has, of course, been considerable discussion amongst historians about whether the 
methodological rules that Butterfield laid down in The Whig Interpretation of History are too exacting 
to be adhered to strictly.  As Adrian Wilson and Timothy Ashplant (1988, p.8) have suggested, for 
Butterfield, “The historical record constitutes a sort of plenum; it is the task of the historian to enter 
that plenum, to inhabit it, and return to the present with an accurate picture of its nature”.  However, 
this would seem to involve a process of “self-emptying” (Hall, 2002, p.732), whereby historians are 
fully cognisant of all the influences that they have accumulated in the present and ensure that these 
play no role in how they write their historical studies.  After all, history in its pristine Butterfield mode 
is not about interpretation so much as revealing the record to the greatest possible degree.  Yet 
despite Butterfield himself latterly showing that he was just one in a long line of historians who 
struggled to write history in the pristine Butterfield mode, his observations on whig history remain 
relevant. 
 
Butterfield’s particular concern was targeted at the routinely repeated story of how the English 
constitution, for all its specificity, was imagined into being as an internally consistent container for 
Whig politics (Butterfield, 1950 [1931], pp.39-40).  As Melinda Zook has shown to great effect, the 
earliest Whigs were only too conscious of their own role in history.  They were writing just after the 
overthrow of the Stuart monarchy in 1688, and they had their own Whig heroes in mind as those few 
who were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to defend against the tyranny of Stuart absolutism the 
personal freedoms that had been handed down from England’s ancient constitution.  Early Whig 
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martyrology was designed to tug on the reader’s heart strings, but equally importantly it also 
established the abstract characteristics of the heroes and villains of English constitutional history: 
noble, Protestant, humble, liberty-loving and unequivocally English for the heroes; duplicitous, 
Catholic, arrogant, tyrannical and very often French for the villains (Zook, 2002, pp.218-223).  Later 
Whigs followed suit by claiming the heroic characteristics as the sole preserve of Whig politicians.  
Butterfield, by contrast, was eager to stress that the faltering steps taken during the early modern 
period towards the modern English constitution resulted from party conflict and not party hegemony.  
He highlighted the “continual interplay and perpetual collision” between Whigs and Tories 
(Butterfield, 1950 [1931], p.41).  Whig historians may well have laid claim to the tradition of pursuing 
personal freedoms when faced with absolutist monarchy, but it was not only their story to tell.  
Edmund Burke, for instance, part of the late eighteenth-century ‘Old Whig’ faction of the House of 
Commons, and transposed in the twentieth century into the philosophical founder of modern 
conservatism, likewise viewed the Glorious Revolution of 1688 through the perspective of attempts 
to protect “our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties” (Burke, 2003 [1790], p.27).  Butterfield, it 
should perhaps be noted, has been described by Martin Wight (1953, p.475) as “the most rounded, 
gentle, and unpessimistic of Burkeans”. 
 
Gove can easily be fitted into the Burkean tradition that Butterfield both reflects and was a critic of, a 
tradition that has represented the mainstream of Conservative Party education policy for forty years 
now.  Buoyed in particular by interventions from the Centre for Policy Studies, the Conservatives 
quickly broke from the attempt to establish a policy consensus on schooling around the 1967 Plowden 
Report (McKiernan, 1993, p.40).  The education studies literature has named the ensuing approach 
that of cultural restorationism.  This is an appeal to the virtues of a traditional education modelled on 
that of the Victorian era (Brocklehurst, 2015, p.55).  The dating is significant.  History has been 
described by Mary Spongberg and Clara Tuite (2011, p.677) as “nineteenth-century England’s most 
characteristic art”, with the rise of history at that time coinciding directly with an important period of 
renewal of the previous century’s exercise in nation-building (MacLaughlin, 2001, p.68).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, when the first generation of professional historians sat down to write 
nineteenth-century textbooks they did so in a way that was deliberately designed to sing the praises 
of the nation that was being produced around them (Kumar, 2003, p.203).  They took the progressivist 
Whig story of the development of a specifically English form of liberty within the sea of continental 
absolutism and presented this as the only possible narrative of national history.  The Conservative 
Party’s cultural restorationist wing thus displayed an essential whiggishness right from the outset.  It 
was not merely the cheap political shot that Gove took it for when John White (2011, p.27) wondered 
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aloud: “How is it that a curriculum designed for clerks and shopkeepers in Dickens’s England is at the 
cutting edge in 2010?” 
 
The debate about the first history curriculum is instructive in this regard.  “As my old friend Kenneth 
Baker also found out,” Gove (2013d, p.7) opined at the height of his own history wars, in reference to 
his counterpart from the late 1980s, “there is no part of the national curriculum so likely to prove an 
ideological battleground for contending armies as history”.  He was right to note the parallels, because 
he and Baker were of pretty much one mind when it came to using the history curriculum to define 
the ‘we’ of the British nation in tub-thumpingly whiggish terms.  The community of professional 
historians was just as frustrated with the Conservative Secretary of State for Education back then as it 
was more recently.  In scarcely concealed irritation, Ball (1993, p.204) characterised the Baker 
curriculum in the following terms: “Britain is to be at the centre of history, a benign and progressive 
influence upon the world, bearer of justice and civilisation”.  Stephen Yeo (1990, p.126) placed the 
proposed Baker curriculum in the context of the politics of its chief public cheerleader, Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher: “It would be clinging to that mother who is always talking about the Mother of 
Parliaments, and who keeps telling foreigners (not one of us) that neither Greeks nor French, nor 
anyone else, has anything to teach us (people like us) about democracy.  We had a French Revolution, 
she told Mitterrand, in 1215.”  The formative British national myth that England’s ancient constitution 
pointed unfailingly in the single direction of liberty was the backdrop that lent ostensible coherence 
to Baker’s preferred history curriculum. 
 
The same remained true a quarter of a century later with Gove’s preferred history curriculum.  The 
conservative philosopher Roger Scruton, a consistent reference point for Gove’s proposals, argued 
repeatedly throughout the early 2000s for a history curriculum reflecting the fact that the English had 
bequeathed the notion of ordered liberty to the rest of Europe (Kenny, 2015, p.44).  Scruton can be 
seen to follow Burke (Dooley, 2009, p.xi) and, with Gove clearly following Scruton, the lineage to 
Butterfield at his own most whiggish seems to be complete.  The path to modernity, from this 
perspective at least, was undoubtedly one that the English had been responsible for creating.  Gove 
believed that he had found exactly the right book for teaching this message: Henrietta Elizabeth 
Marshall’s 1905 Our Island Story.  To celebrate the centenary of its first publication, in 2005 the right-
wing think tank Civitas teamed up with the right-wing Daily Telegraph to ensure that a copy of the 
book was sent to every primary school throughout Britain (Smith and Green, 2017, p.389).  Marshall’s 
narrative appears at first glance to have been structured around a clear Whig constitutional 
progressivism, and it evidently appealed to those who wanted to read their own political purposes 
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into its pages.  Gove constantly nodded deferentially towards it when describing his ambitions for the 
history curriculum in terms of Britain’s ‘island story’.  David Cameron, meanwhile, revealed it to be 
the favourite and most influential book of his childhood.  However, it is not necessary to go much 
beyond scratching the surface of the lineage that Gove and Cameron claimed for themselves to see 
that nothing is particularly clear cut here.  The sense of a fractured lineage extends beyond Tom 
Holland’s (2014) statement that “Marshall herself … was no Tory”.  It goes to the heart of arguably the 
most fundamental contradiction of Gove’s preferred curriculum: how to ground chronological 
national history in the actions of heroes of centuries past whilst inhabiting a notion of Britain that is 
suitable for a modern multicultural society. 
 
 
Imperial Heroes and the Gove Curriculum 
 
Gove appears to have been somewhat entranced by the notions of British heroes and by how a fact-
based curriculum could be fleshed out by requiring students to learn the names, the dates and the key 
interventions of a select band amongst their number.  The Better History Group, another pressure 
group much to Gove’s liking, helpfully provided a series of indicative examination questions to show 
how to embed the focus on heroes into the assessment regime.  “Why did Nelson and Wellington 
become national heroes?”, it asked, without any reflection on whether the terrain of judgement is 
now sufficiently contested that English schoolchildren might want to challenge the assumption that 
they should treat people like Nelson and Wellington as unproblematic national heroes (Evans, 2011, 
p.11).  English schoolchildren are apparently to inhabit unproblematically the thought processes of 
these national heroes so as to discover for themselves what it means to have inherited the national 
character.  Butterfield’s (1950 [1931], ch.V) historical method of ‘imaginative sympathy’ thus seems 
to be invoked, albeit extremely narrowly so.  He had suggested that the “human personality is the only 
entity of the historian’s study” (Butterfield, cited in Hall, 2002, p.721), but with personalities of the 
past being examined by people of the present, Butterfield seemed prepared to meet whig historians 
at least half-way by saying that some sort of judgement would necessarily have to be applied in the 
present (Hobart, 1971, p.545).  The Better History Group’s indicative examination questions, by 
contrast, seem to exclude the possibility of explicitly moral judgement being exercised by students 
today, with Gove’s preferred history curriculum also appearing to follow suit in asserting that there 
was to be no discussion of who counts as a national hero and no scope for students to volunteer their 




Problems immediately begin to emerge, however, because there is no evidence from the text of Our 
Island Story to suggest that Marshall had anywhere near the same instinctive fascination for national 
heroes as Gove so clearly does.  Butterfield’s ‘imaginative sympathy’ can hardly be turned into the 
empathy that will serve tomorrow’s citizens well if all they are presented with at school is an island 
story requiring them to memorise the details of ‘heroic’ monarchs, politicians and warriors (Bowen, 
in Bowen et al, 2012, p.132).  This is the story that Gove and Cameron said could be taken directly 
from Marshall; Baker and Thatcher had previously emphasised the virtues of exactly the same form of 
rote learning.  However, even though Marshall does tell a story of kings and queens and prime 
ministers and generals organised around the central motif of liberal constitutional history, this is only 
in the midst of a much more expansive cast list.  Whilst Gove was busily appropriating Our Island Story 
as a classically conservative text, the popular historian Antonia Fraser (2005) used an article in the 
same Daily Telegraph that had raised money for the Civitas reprint as a reminder that her foreword 
to that reprint had emphasised the consciously subversive nature of Marshall’s text.  The judgements 
she passed on monarchs were palpably moral in nature, all of which were informed by her starting 
position that the monarchy existed to serve the people.  Political leaders were also judged by 
standards that were more instinctively sympathetic to rebels than to rulers, and the underpinning 
narrative of Our Island Story is propelled by openly pacifist assumptions (Vallance, 2010, pp.4-9).  So 
much, then, for ‘heroic’ monarchs, politicians and warriors as the guardians of a liberal 
constitutionalist tradition. 
 
A further problem arises from who it is, in particular, that was likely to populate the category of ‘hero’ 
in Gove’s preferred curriculum.  One of his most animated concerns across various subject fields was 
that the curriculum he inherited was too modern – overly focused on the twentieth century in both 
its pedagogical style and its content (Gove, 2009a, p.3, 2010a, p.4, 2014b, p.6).  Recentring the history 
curriculum in preceding centuries, however, meant that the heroes whose lives were called upon to 
drive a connected history of Britain were likely to be specifically colonial heroes.  It was around such 
issues that Gove found another way to elevate himself to a position of expertise, from which he could 
talk to professional historians as their presumed equal.  A lot of this, it should be remembered, came 
from the ridicule he felt able to pour on his political opponents within the educational establishment.  
One Gove mantra that proved particularly important in this regard was the ‘infantilisation’ of the 
curriculum.  “Teachers can turn”, he said with his critics at the Historical Association firmly in his sights, 
“to guidance on ‘Primary pedagogy and interactive powerpoints’ where it is suggested that a project 
about rail travel should focus on the – no doubt – highly influential historical character of George 
Stephenson’s friend, Eddy the Teddy” (Gove, 2013d, p.7).  Later in the speech he returned to the same 
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theme by assuring his audience that the curriculum “won’t be improved by taking out Clive of India 
and Wolfe of Quebec and replacing them with Eddy the Teddy” (Gove, 2013d, p.8).  Two competing 
cultures of expertise were thus once again invoked: one – Gove’s – associating British history with the 
actual actions of Clive of India and Wolfe of Quebec; the other – not Gove’s – associating British history 
with the made-up actions of Eddy the Teddy. 
 
However, this placed Gove on political territory that was too much even for some of his erstwhile 
backers.  Simon Schama, originally a proponent of the kind of connected history that Gove preferred, 
baulked at the content being suggested.  Robert Clive had risen from a junior factor responsible for 
company accounts to the Commander-in-Chief of the British East India Company’s standing army.  As 
his popular epithet ‘of India’ suggests, perhaps more than anyone he was responsible for the military 
victories that united India as a single British dominion.  Gove clearly thought that this was a story of 
heroic achievement in which British children could today still take pride; Schama appealed to more 
modern-day sensibilities by describing Clive as a “sociopathic, corrupt thug”, someone who made “our 
most dodgy bankers look like a combination of Mary Poppins and Jesus Christ” (Schama, cited in 
Furness, 2013).  The existing curriculum that drew Gove’s derision was also supported by a well-
received textbook that asked students to reflect on whether Clive continues to deserve the heroic 
status traditionally ascribed to him (Culpin, Byrom and Riley, 2008).  Moral judgement will always 
matter, the critics said, to how facts are received and processed. 
 
As Peter Yeandle (2014, p.899) notes, the politics of curriculum design is now such that the left is much 
more likely than the right to make the case for a curriculum that includes discussion of imperial heroes.  
It does so, of course, as a means of emphasising how ‘heroes’ are the subjects of social construction, 
and how changes to society’s moral standards require a focus on the way heroic status is taken away 
every bit as much as on the way it is conferred.  Gove’s entirely uncritical invocation of Clive as a 
legitimate British hero therefore seems to reflect a vision of national identity that can only be seen in 
throwback terms (Young, 2011, p.267).  Early in his tenure of the education brief Gove had provided 
a template for who should be included on his list of heroes: those who had “ventured to the hidden 
corners of the globe” (Gove, 2007, p.2).  Yet these people embarked on their voyages for a purpose, 
and that purpose is likely to receive rather different moral judgements today than when these voyages 
were originally undertaken.  We know now the imperial world that was constructed on the back of 
this adventurous spirit, and we also know now where that world sits in relation to contemporary 
systems of ethics.  Gove’s island story, however, attempted to portray these events as unflinching 
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historical facts that could be learnt and repeated but never questioned and challenged as to how well 
they reflected upon the national past. 
 
Marshall’s Our Island Story once again makes a very informative comparator.  The preface provides 
abundant evidence of how the ensuing narrative is to be read and where, psychologically speaking, its 
departure point is to be located.  The book was written, she tells us, as an elegy to home, presenting 
England to ex-pat children growing up in British colonies (Marshall, 2005 [1905], pp.xxi-xxii).  It sought 
to inform the young and potentially impressionable minds of those who had never been to the Mother 
Country despite the emotional attachments to it that they had been brought up to observe (Garton-
Ash, 2009, p.49).  Marshall explicitly denied that what her readers would encounter was history in any 
conventional sense: the fact that it is called Our Island Story and not Our Island History is deeply 
significant; the fact that its opening words are “Once upon a time” equally so (Marshall, 2005 [1905], 
p.1).  Her intention was to provide the in-group of a geographically-dispersed Greater Britain with a 
means of visualising their place within a broader structure of belonging (Wellings, 2016, p.370).  She 
did this through producing a story about empire where facts merged seamlessly with national myth-
making to create the desired effect.  Gove and Cameron might well still take their own preferred story 
of empire from the influence that Marshall’s book left on their childhood selves.  Yet to have believed 
that it simply provides the facts of a connected history is contradicted by pretty much every chapter 
in the book. 
 
Marshall did not really do heroes of any traditional sort – neither Nelson nor Wellington being 
described using typical ‘heroic’ language, and Clive drawing commentary merely for the “cleverness” 
of his military tactics (Marshall, 2005 [1905], pp.445-7, 450-2, 425).  Moreover, whilst Our Island Story 
and the later Our Empire Story are clearly of their age, they were not written with the imperial Tory 
jingoism of the early twentieth century (Holland, 2014).  It is noticeable, for instance, that the index 
refers to ‘Clive in India’ and not ‘Clive of India’ (Marshall, 2005 [1905], p.514).  There were certainly 
frequent lapses into the stereotyping of colonised others that was such a prominent feature of 
intellectual life in Edwardian Britain.  However, the Greater Britain that Marshall was attempting to 
construct in the minds of her readers was one where multiple narrative accounts were available and 
where empathetic relationships could develop between the bearers of those competing accounts.  
“The stories are not all bright”, she warned readers of Our Empire Story.  “How should they be?  We 
have made mistakes, we have been checked here, we have stumbled there” (Marshall, 2006 [1908], 




The general essence of Gove’s complaints about the history curriculum would not have been out of 
place in any of the previous forty years of Conservative Party politics.  Yet the Conservative pioneers 
of the call for a return to traditional education had tried to decouple their heroes from a relationship 
with empire.  There was always an emphasis on those who had purportedly enhanced national life by 
their success in military ventures against powerful European enemies (Husbands, Kitson and Pendry, 
2003, p.122).  However, there was never an attempt to use the history curriculum to start a dialogue 
about what these European wars were for.  The chain of reason was to be cut short before students 
could be invited to reflect upon the implications of these military engagements for the world outside 
Europe.  They were, of course, wars fought by imperial powers with significant consequences for the 
future shape of the colonial world.  The celebration of soldiers and sailors and the claims they made 
on ‘new’ territory on behalf of the British crown were essential to bringing life to the imperial culture 
that dominated Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dawson, 1994; Conley, 2009; 
Berenson, 2011).  The celebratory tone of that culture was maintained in Conservative manifestos for 
a renewed emphasis on a traditional curriculum.  Significantly, though, the surrounding context of 
international politics that gave meaning to the celebrations was left noticeably unexplained.  Yeandle 
(2014, p.885) suggests that this highlights essential ambiguities in the minds of Conservative thought 
leaders about “the usability of the imperial past”.  Gove might therefore be regarded as a one-of-a-
kind in this regard, because he appeared to exhibit no such qualms.  As his critics were only too eager 
to point out, though, had the preferred Gove curriculum been implemented in full it would have led 
to the systematic exclusion from feelings of Britishness for all students for whom the history of empire 





Whig history is always politicised history and, as demonstrated by Gove’s time as Secretary of State 
for Education, the expertise that a whig historian displays is always in the service of a particular 
political cause.  Throughout the preceding sections, however, I have made reference to Gove’s 
preferred curriculum rather than to the form that the curriculum now takes.  This reflects the fact that 
his attempts at rhetorical entrapment eventually came to naught, his political bluff was called and he 
was forced to backtrack on many of his core objectives in the face of significant public pressure.  He 
tried to explain away his failure by saying that the preferences he had outlined in robust manner 
during the history wars were merely “my opening offer in the negotiation bazaar of the curriculum”.  
His full-scale retreat was never formally recognised in the post hoc rationalisation that “compromise” 
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was always his objective (Gove, 2013g).  Joseph Smith (2017, p.324) consequently concludes that “the 
spectacle of contestation was as great a prize to Gove as the curriculum itself”. 
 
As Gove’s critics repeatedly pointed out, contestation was inevitable, because whig histories are 
always likely to prove internally inconsistent if they are not exclusionary on the matter of who can 
recognise themselves in the underlying narrative.  They will require a clearly articulated ‘outside’ if 
they are to leave the impression of an identifiable national character.  The first Whigs wilfully exploited 
this type of distinction when positing the existence of an authentic ‘us’ to which Stuart absolutism 
could be positioned as a threatening ‘them’.  Later Whigs followed suit in presenting access to a liberal 
constitutional tradition as the essence of the good fortune of being born British, a serendipitous state 
of affairs denied to overseas friend and foe alike.  The pursuit of empire provided an international 
stage on which to project the image of British exceptionalism, with still later Whigs typically failing 
even to catch breath before extolling Britain’s right to settle distant lands in the interests of an 
ostensibly civilising mission.  In all of these instances, whiggish approaches to history emerged in the 
contrast between the presumed essence of Britishness and the claims that could be made about 
Britain’s ‘others’.  What, then, should we read into Gove’s extreme whig history of Britain that would 
have been based on a narrative of heroes undertaking exceptional deeds that highlighted an equally 
exceptional national character? 
 
His preferred curriculum completely failed to recognise that ‘the British’ now consist of large numbers 
of people who whig histories traditionally have tended to treat as their ‘others’.  Gove made no secret 
of his desire to control the definition of the past for English schools: there was just one national past 
that required just one story, and his island story was the one way to tell it if students were to remain 
spellbound by what it means to be British.  Anyone who makes an effort to control the definition of 
the past, of course, is simultaneously trying to control who has access to the prevailing image of the 
nation.  The construction of national history is forever an attempt at constructing the ‘us’ who can be 
contrasted to a ‘them’.  Gove never explained why anyone should believe that a curriculum that 
mythologises the whiteness of the national past would resonate with a broad-based conception of the 
contemporary British ‘us’.  It might be expected to play well within the echo chamber of a Conservative 
Party Conference hall, but Conservative Party members are hardly a representative reflection of the 
British population as a whole.  Multicultural Britain requires something rather more than an emphasis 




In 2007, just as Gove was handed the shadow education brief, the Department for Communities and 
Local Government published a report that linked the enhancement of community cohesion in a 
multicultural society to a process of historical myth-busting (Harris, 2013, p.405).  Gove’s preferred 
curriculum, by contrast, seems to have wanted to reassert historical myths of white superiority.  The 
one-size-fits-all account of British citizenship that was reflected in his island story was undoubtedly an 
account that privileged whiteness as the underlying marker of what it means to be British (Alexander 
and Weekes-Bernard, 2017, p.479).  Even before the date that Gove envisaged his new curriculum 
coming on-stream, there was ample evidence that all English secondary school students, regardless of 
race, were struggling to recognise themselves in what was being taught as British history (Harris and 
Reynolds, 2014, p.464).  This situation was, predictably, particularly marked for students of colour.  In 
being unable to see people like themselves in the curriculum’s prescribed understanding of the 
national past, they were denied access to what they were being told was a common thread of British 
citizenship.  Gove’s preferred curriculum would only have accentuated what was in any case already 
a troubling situation.  It would have restricted still further the feeling of an emotional connection to 
tradition to only a racially privileged in-group.  Establishing who ‘we’ are simultaneously means 
establishing who has to be told that they are not part of ‘us’.  Butterfield provided good reasons in the 
1930s for why whig history should be challenged on these grounds, and Gove’s attempts to remodel 
the history curriculum in English schools through an extreme whiggish version of British history shows 
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